INTRODUCTION
This Article reports the conclusions of an empirical study 1 1. The authors of this study were solicited by attorneys for Edward Montour, of every murder conviction in Colorado between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2010. 2 Our goal was to determine: (1) what percentage of first-degree murderers in Colorado were eligible for the death penalty; and (2) how often the death penalty was sought against these killers. More generally, the purpose of the study was to determine whether Colorado's statutory aggravating factors meaningfully narrow the class of death-eligible offenders. We do not offer conclusions on whether particular cases are well suited for capital punishment; indeed, we do not scrutinize any particular prosecutorial sentencing choice. Our study reports on the failures of Colorado's capital sentencing system, not on any specific errors of prosecutors in seeking or not seeking death in a particular case.
We discovered that while the death penalty was an option in approximately 90% of all first-degree murders, it was sought by the prosecution initially in only 3% of those killings, who was sentenced to death in Colorado. Mr. Montour's sentence was subsequently reversed, his guilty plea was set aside, and he is currently awaiting retrial at the trial court level. Attorneys for Mr. Montour, along with paralegals and interns, collected the data described in this study and presented it to us for analysis. The compiling of the data, the analysis, and the conclusions are entirely our own. We consulted with defense counsel regarding their intended use of the study, on issues relating to timing, and in preparing earlier versions of the study for filing with the court. However, the study design is based on the best practices in the field and our judgment and analysis are independent. In particular, we relied on a leading reference book as a foundation for the study design. See . We did not defer to defense counsel on any questions of form or substance. On the contrary, we have had the study methodology and the study findings independently verified by experts in the fields of law and sociology. We are indebted to counsel and Mr. Montour for their support and foresight; it is not every day that trial counsel for a defendant commissions an independent study. We are also grateful to Erin Kincaid, J.D. 2012, who has helped us research, edit, and write this Article.
2. Similar studies have been done in other states, but unlike other studies, ours is based on a complete dataset of all homicides in Colorado for a 12-year period, rather than a sample of cases. Even leading scholars such as David Baldus have compiled data and reached conclusions based on a sample of homicide cases from a district. See, e.g., Declar. pursued all the way through sentencing in only 1% of those killings, and obtained in only 0.6% of all cases. 3 These numbers compel the conclusion that Colorado's capital sentencing system fails to satisfy the constitutional imperative of creating clear statutory standards for distinguishing between the few who are executed and the many who commit murder.
The Eighth Amendment requires that determinations of life and death be made at the level of reasoned legislative judgment, and not on an ad hoc basis by prosecutors whose decisions, in reviewing individual cases, might be tainted by implicit biases. 4 More specifically, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a State's capital sentencing statute must serve the "constitutionally necessary function . . . [of] circumscrib[ing] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" such that only the very worst are eligible for the law's ultimate punishment. 5 Colorado's system is unconstitutional insofar as nearly all first-degree murderers are statutorily eligible to be executed. Our study, then, shows that Colorado's statutory system fails to sufficiently narrow the class of deatheligible offenders. 6 3. By generating a complete set of homicides and including both actual firstdegree murders and cases that factually justified first-degree murder convictions, we have avoided the problems associated with sampling errors and the possible skewing of data that would occur if, for example, we had only studied cases in which there was an actual first-degree murder conviction. Some scholars have noted that focusing exclusively on cases where there is an actual first-degree murder conviction might skew the dataset toward those killings most likely to be aggravated. See, e.g., Requiem for Furman, supra note 2, at 1333.
4. Indeed, the most comprehensive prior study of Colorado's death penalty found that "[e]ven though Colorado prosecutors appear to be quite selective in pursuing the death penalty, the evidence suggests that death penalty decisions are not being made equitably." Stephanie Hindson, Hillary Potter & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Gender, Region and Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980 Colorado, -1999 U. COLO. L. REV. 549, 581 (2006) ("The data show that prosecutorial decisions to seek death sentences in Colorado . . . are strongly correlated with race, ethnicity, and gender of the homicide victim.").
5. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983). 6. In McGautha v. California, the Court approved a system under which any person convicted of first-degree murder could be sentenced to death at the discretion of the jury. 402 U.S. 183 (1971) . This form of standardless sentencing was rejected as inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment in Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) . More recently the Court has recognized that in certain instances where first-degree murder is very narrowly defined, the narrowing requirements of the Eighth Amendment can be accomplished by a first-degree murder conviction. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 245 (1988) . However, in order for the Eighth Amendment to be satisfied, the definition of capital murder must be very restrictive such that a conviction of first-degree murder is equivalent to finding both guilt and the presence of an aggravating factor. Id. at 242 (noting that under applicable state law, first-degree murder was limited to Furthermore, the fact that nearly all first-degree murderers in Colorado are eligible for death but very, very few receive that penalty 7 suggests that the system is laden with arbitrariness. At first blush it may seem counterintuitive to conclude that a death penalty used too infrequently is unconstitutional. However, the statistical rarity of death sentences was a salient feature of the death penalty schemes declared unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia. 8 As Justice Stewart explained, when the death penalty is only imposed upon a "random handful" of the defendants statutorily eligible for the punishment, its application is "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." 9 A constitutionally sound capital sentencing system must limit the discretion of prosecutors and jurors such that the determination of life and death is not one of caprice or arbitrariness. 10 This Article provides empirical support for the instances where, for example, the defendant kills or attempts to kill more than one person, killed for pecuniary gain, killed a peace officer, or killed a child under twelve). Unlike the statute at issue in Lowenfield, Colorado's statutory definition of first-degree murder is one of the broadest in the country-indeed it includes even nonintentional killings. See infra text accompanying notes 70-81 (explaining Colorado's definition of first-degree murder). Notably, Colorado's criminal code does create a separate crime for murdering a peace officer and defines it as firstdegree murder. C.R.S. § 18-3-107 (2012). Accordingly, if the Colorado legislature abolished the more general first-degree murder catchall provision, Id. § 18-3-102, the crime of killing a peace officer could function as a form of first-degree murder that sufficiently narrows the class of death-eligible offenders as required by Lowenfield.
7. See infra Part III.B. 8. Furman, 408 U.S. at 299. 9. Id. at 309. Scholars have observed that the Court's conclusion that the death penalty was unconstitutional in Furman was based in large part on the low death sentencing ratios-that is, the low percentage of defendants who were eligible for the death penalty that were actually sentenced to death. See, e.g., Requiem for Furman, supra note 2, at 1287 ("The Court's determination in Furman that the death penalty was being applied to a 'random handful' was grounded in empirical data concerning death sentence ratios at the time."); id. at 1288 ("In Furman, the Justices' conclusion that the death penalty was imposed only infrequently derived from their understanding that only 15-20% of convicted murderers who were death-eligible were being sentenced to death."); see also [Vol. 84 conclusion that Colorado's capital sentencing system fails to genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible offenders so as to minimize the risk of arbitrariness. Simply put, we demonstrate that there is no meaningful way to distinguish between the many who are eligible for the penalty and the very few who receive it. 11 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with a review of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the Court's requirement of qualitative and quantitative narrowing. 12 That is, we demonstrate that in order to be constitutional, a state sentencing scheme must both narrow the pool of the deatheligible (quantitatively narrow) 13 and make meaningful distinctions between who lives and who dies (qualitatively narrow). 14 Part II describes our own methodology from data collection through coding and analysis, and situates our study within the existing body of research in this field. Finally, we set forth our conclusions in Part III. In sum, the question of whether Colorado's death penalty statute satisfies the Eighth Amendment by narrowing the class of eligible offenders is fundamentally an empirical question. This Article responds to that question by providing empirical data demonstrating that Colorado's sentencing scheme fails to satisfy its constitutional mandate.
requirement's primary aim is to reduce arbitrariness by confining the discretion of jurors and prosecutors to a particularly heinous group of offenders, making it more likely that culpability rather than caprice will drive their decision making.").
11. Although our data only show the rate of death eligibility and the death sentence rate without offering an explanation for the cases where a sentence of death is imposed, because the number of death sentences is so low, it is relatively easy to draw some quick conclusions. For example, it is clear that similar crimes and arguably even more egregious crimes committed during the study period did not result in death sentences. Likewise, the fact that two of the three death sentences during our study period arose out of a single county may signal that geographic location more than aggravation tends to predict the likelihood of a death sentence.
12. See, e.g., Requiem for Furman, supra note 2, at 1294. 13. Professors Shatz and Rivkind have explained the quantitative narrowing as a requirement that the death penalty be imposed in a "demonstrably smaller" rate than all murder cases. Requiem for Furman, supra note 2, at 1294 (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988)).
14. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (recognizing the need for a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many in which it is not").
I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY
The Supreme Court has largely policed the imposition of the death penalty in the United States through the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. This Part summarizes the relevant case law pertaining to eligibility and selection of defendants for the death penalty and then applies that jurisprudence to the Colorado statute.
A. The Narrowing Requirement
For most of the death penalty's history in this country, the Supreme Court devoted little attention to its constitutionality. In fact, in 1971, in McGautha v. California, the Court held that the death penalty was such a difficult topic to sensibly regulate that the states were free to leave the ultimate determination of how it should be imposed to the whims of capital juries. 15 There was a sense among the Justices that drafting statutes capable of distinguishing between the most culpable defendants deserving of death and the less culpable who were not was a fool's errand. 16 Drafting capital sentencing statutes for this purpose was, the Court concluded, a task that is "beyond present human ability." 17 Consequently, the capital sentencing statutes during the pre-Furman era were "purposely constructed to allow the maximum possible variation from one case to the next." 18 The Court abruptly reversed course in 1972 in the landmark Furman v. Georgia decision. 19 Furman consisted of ten total opinions: a short, one paragraph per curiam opinion and one separate opinion written by each of the nine Justices. 20 15. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 185 (1971) . 16. Id. at 204 ("To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.").
17. Id. 18. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("We are now imprisoned in the McGautha holding. Indeed the seeds of the present cases are in McGautha. Juries (or judges, as the case may be) have practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die.").
19. 408 U.S. 238. 20. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 9, at 362 (identifying Furman as the "longest decision ever to appear in the U.S. Reports").
The only paragraph of the decision joined by five or more Justices curtly concluded that "the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [the cases before the Court] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 21 Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall wrote separate opinions concurring in the judgment, but concluding that the death penalty was always unconstitutional. 22 Three of the Justices-Potter Stewart, Byron White, and William O. Douglas-did not find the death penalty categorically unconstitutional, but rather found fault with the specifics of the sentencing systems under review. 23 Although there is no clear "narrowest grounds" 24 among these three concurring Justices, scholars and courts have tended to treat some combination of the Stewart, White, and Douglas opinions as stating the controlling constitutional rule. 25 Justices Stewart, 26 White, 27 and Douglas 28 emphasized not the injustice of the death penalty generally, but the arbitrariness of the capital sentencing process. As Justice Douglas explained, "It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices." 29 That is to say, Douglas was concerned about procedures that allow for too much discretion on the part of the prosecutor or the jury, and thus found the statutes under review unconstitutional because " [u] Similarly, Justice Stewart emphasized the randomness inherent in the capital sentencing statutes under review, famously noting that "[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." 32 Of particular note, Stewart emphasized that low death sentence rates-imposing death sentences on a "random handful" of the defendants who were eligible for death-suggest that a capital sentencing system is wanton and unconstitutional. 33 The third and final critical opinion in support of finding the death penalty statutes at issue in Furman unconstitutional-Justice White's-again emphasized the arbitrariness of capital sentencing schemes under which the death penalty is too "seldom . . . imposed" relative to the number defendants who are statutorily death-eligible. 34 What the opinions of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White have in common, therefore, is two principal concerns regarding the arbitrariness of the state death penalty systems. First, the statutes in question did not provide a reasoned basis for determining who would be sentenced to death and who would not. Second, the scarcity of the death sentences relative to the number of defendants who were death-eligible weighed against 30. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring); accord id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments.").
32. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J. concurring). 33. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 34. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring) ("[J]udges and juries have ordered the death penalty with such infrequency that the odds are now very much against imposition and execution of the penalty with respect to any convicted murderer or rapist."). Justice White explained that when the death penalty is infrequently imposed on those who are eligible-when the death sentence rate is too low-the penalty serves neither deterrent nor retributive ends. Id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring). On the basis of these conclusions he recognized that "[a] penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring) (explaining that "as the statutes before us are now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice").
the statutes' constitutionality. 35 If capital punishment were necessary to serve a legitimate government interest, they reasoned, it would not be imposed in only a small fraction of those cases in which it was available. 36 As leading death penalty scholars have observed, "What was intolerable at the time of Furman and what remains intolerable today is [a low] ratio of death-eligibility to offenses-resulting-in-death." 37 As Professor Shatz has emphasized, the decision to strike down the challenged death penalty schemes in Furman rested in substantial part on the fact that "only 15-20% of convicted murderers who were death eligible were being sentenced to death." 38 Stated more directly, scholars have recognized that a 35. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and White all spoke to this issue in their respective opinions. Justice Douglas cited favorably to a study finding that "[t]he extreme rarity with which applicable death penalty provisions are put to use raises a strong inference of arbitrariness." Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also explained that "[w]hen the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily." Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart similarly explained:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race. Id. at. 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Finally, Justice White wrote:
[W]hen imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied. Nor could it be said with confidence that society's need for specific deterrence justifies death for so few when for so many in like circumstances life imprisonment or shorter prison terms are judged sufficient, or that community values are measurably reinforced by authorizing a penalty so rarely invoked. Id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring).
37. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 9, at 415. In theory, increasing the number of executions in a jurisdiction could also cure a low death sentencing rate. However, when the eligibility rate for first-degree murders is above 50%, or above 90% as it is in Colorado, it is not feasible or desirable to imagine executing this number of people. It is the high eligibility rate-the failure of the aggravating factors to meaningfully narrow-that makes the death sentencing rate unconstitutionally low. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
38. Requiem for Furman, supra note 2, at 1288; id. at 1289 ("Although in Furman and Gregg the Court referred to the percentage of 'those convicted of murder' who were sentenced to death, the Justices had to be concerned with the critical calculation for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of a capital sentencing scheme is the death sentence ratio-the number of death sentences per deatheligible murderers. Though 46. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (stating that when considering sentencing a person to death, "the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering"); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (mandating individualized consideration before sentencing defendants in capital cases).
agree on a set of principles within which to judge a particular statute made it difficult for a state legislature to enact a constitutionally valid death penalty. All that the majority of the court endorsed is that under some circumstances, and subject to a number of limitations, the death penalty may be imposed. 47 States seeking to impose the death penalty, then, must navigate between these two constitutional requirements. They cannot, under Furman, leave the sentencer the unfettered discretion whether to impose the death penalty or not, 48 and they cannot, under Woodson, require that the death penalty be imposed under certain circumstances. 49 This task of complying with the dual procedural requirements of the Eighth Amendment has resulted in an ongoing dialogue between the states and the Supreme Court regarding the propriety of various sentencing systems. All cases of homicide of every category are contained within the pyramid. The consequences flowing to the perpetrator increase in severity as the cases proceed from the base to the apex, with the death penalty applying only to those few cases which are contained in the space just beneath the apex. To reach that category, a case must pass through three planes of division between the base and the apex. The first plane of division above the base separates from all homicide cases those which fall into the category of murder. . . . The second plane separates from all murder cases those in which the penalty of death is a possible punishment. This plane is established by statutory definitions of aggravating circumstances. . . . The third plane separates, from all cases in which a penalty of death may be imposed, those cases in which it shall be imposed. There is an absolute discretion in the factfinder to place any given case below the plane and not impose death. . . . A case may not pass the second plane into that area in which the death penalty is authorized unless at least one statutory aggravating circumstance is found. However, this plane is passed regardless of the number of statutory aggravating circumstances found, so long as there is at least one. 55
In upholding the constitutionality of this statute the Court elaborated upon the practical consequences of the Furman/Gregg line of cases. In explaining the holding of Gregg, the Court emphasized that a capital sentencing scheme avoids the arbitrariness and over-inclusiveness problems identified in Furman if the statutory aggravating factors "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." 56 Moreover, the Court explicitly recognized that the process of narrowing is a legislative, not a prosecutorial function. 57 Notably, then, it is this requirement of legislative narrowing that renders sensible the otherwise counterintuitive claim that a capital sentencing scheme that produces too low of a death sentence rate is unconstitutional. It is not that the State needs to execute more people in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment, but rather, the low death sentencing ratio is indicative of a failure to legislatively narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to the worst of the worst. If the death penalty scheme is appropriately narrowed, then "it becomes reasonable to expect that juries-even given discretion not to impose the death penalty-will impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined." 58 Zant and its line of cases thus stand for the proposition that a valid capital sentencing statute is one that genuinely narrows the field of killers to those upon whom death could be imposed. 59 It is generally agreed that this narrowing must be both quantitative and qualitative. 60 That is, a capital statute both must reduce the number of killers who are eligible for death and must do so in ways that identify the worst offenders. 61 Once the statute has done this work, Zant holds, the McGautha principle 62 -that the ultimate decision of who lives and who dies may be made without guidance by a jury exercising the conscience of the community-still applies. 63 Thus, the constitutionally required narrowing must occur at the legislative level in order to limit the unchecked discretion of prosecutors in deciding whom to prosecute under a statute, 64 and of juries in imposing the ultimate punishment. This fact has not been missed by the Colorado Supreme Court. In striking down a previous version of the Colorado capital sentencing statute, the state supreme court summarized the law as follows:
A statute must meet at least two requirements before it can serve as the basis for imposition of the death sentence. First, it must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the . . . cases in which it is imposed from (those) in which it 58. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (emphasis in original); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327 (1989) (noting that if death is not imposed in a "substantial portion" of the cases where there is death eligibility, then the problems of wanton and freakish application of the death penalty are not cured) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222)).
59. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 (stating that the "aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty"). is not." To do so, the statute must contain "objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." To attain this end, the legislature may enumerate specific aggravating factors, the presence of which will serve to justify the imposition of a sentence of death. 65 Like the Colorado Supreme Court, our study takes the following position as the baseline for reviewing the constitutionality of a capital sentencing system: while the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional, and while discretion and judgment have a role to play in the determining of the law's ultimate punishment, in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment the capital statute itself must meaningfully narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. There must be limits on the otherwise broad and revered doctrine of prosecutorial discretion and the guided discretion enjoyed by jurors in making the final life or death determination under Zant. 66 If the Furman principle of narrowing 67 is to be given any constitutional effect, it must serve as a limit on legislatures such that the capital sentencing statute meaningfully limits the number of death-eligible defendants.
B. The Colorado Death Penalty Scheme
In this section, we discuss the provisions of the Colorado death penalty statute in light of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. We show that the structure of the statute-with its capacious definition of first-degree murder and long list of aggravating factors-fails to meet the constitutional requirement of singling out the worst of the worst offenders for the law's ultimate punishment.
In a general sense, the death penalty statute in Colorado 68 is similar in form to the statute approved by the Supreme he jury shall not render a verdict of death unless it unanimously finds and specifies in writing that: (A) At least one aggravating factor has been proved; and (B) There are insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factor or factors that were proved." Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(b)(II). Deciphering the triple negative, the statue could be read to require that death is the punishment for a defendant with an aggravator unless there is sufficient mitigating evidence to justify sparing his or her lifethat is, that death is the default in such circumstances. However, the Colorado Supreme Court has described a four step sentencing process following a firstdegree murder conviction:
First, the jury must determine if at least one of the statutory aggravating factors exists. If the jury does not unanimously agree that the prosecution has proven the existence of at least one statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must be sentenced to life imprisonment. Second, if the jury has found that at least one statutory aggravating factor has been proven, the jury must then consider whether any mitigating factors exist. There shall be no burden of proof as to proving or disproving mitigating factors, and the jury need not unanimously agree upon the existence of mitigating factors. Third, the jury must determine whether sufficient mitigating factors exist which outweigh any aggravating factor or factors found to exist. Fourth, and finally, if the jury finds that any mitigating factors do not outweigh the proven statutory aggravating factors, it must decide whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment." People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo. 1990) (citations and internal references omitted); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)(III) (2012) (permitting a final act of juror discretion but instructing that the jury shall render a decision " [b] ased on the considerations [of aggravating factors and whether they are outweighed by mitigating factors], whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment").
Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has held, in relation to a prior version of the statute, that capital sentences are not mandatory whenever the facts in mitigation fail to outweigh the facts in aggravation. There is nothing about individualized mitigating factors and the weighing of those factors that serves to provide legislative definitions that readily distinguish those who are worthy of a death sentence from those who are not. That is to say, Colorado's definition of death eligibility appears to be in some tension with the phrase "death eligibility" as that term of art has been defined in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
77. See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244-45 (rejecting the argument that because "the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury at the sentencing phase was identical to an element of the capital crime" the death sentence was unconstitutional and noting that "[t]he use of 'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons"); id. at 246 ("It seems clear to us from this discussion that the narrowing function required for a regime of capital punishment may be provided in either of these two ways: The legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital offenses, as Texas and Louisiana have done, so that the jury finding of guilt responds to this concern, or the legislature may more broadly define capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase."). fails in both regards.
First, Colorado's definition of first-degree murder, 78 far from meaningfully narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants, is one of the broadest known in law. As a matter of hornbook law, what generally separates first-degree murder from lesser forms of homicide is the requirement that, in order to convict a defendant of first-degree murder, the state must show that the defendant acted after premeditation, or something similarly intentional and egregious. 79 Under Colorado law, by contrast, one can also be found guilty of firstdegree murder for felony murder 80 or even murder by extreme indifference. 81 It is notable that in Colorado a felony murder is necessarily a first-degree murder because there is no seconddegree felony murder category. 82 The inclusion of these unintended killings in the definition of first-degree murder is quite unusual. 83 In jurisdictions in which the first-degree murder statute has been recognized as serving the constitutionally mandated narrowing function, such as Louisiana, first-degree murder is limited to specific types of intentional killings: those that occur during certain aggravated felonies or for pecuniary gain, or where the victim was a peace officer or under 12 years of age. 84 Because the definition of first-degree murder is so broad in Colorado, the [a]cting either alone or with one or more persons, he or she commits or attempts to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault . . . , sexual assault in the first or second degree . . . , or a class 3 felony for sexual assault on a child . . . , or the crime of escape . . . , and, in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone . . . .").
81. 91. Based on previous studies examining the capital sentencing statutes in every state, it appears that only California has more aggravating factors than Colorado. Summarizing the states with some of the highest number of aggravating factors, Professor Kirchmeier observed: "Arizona has ten, South Carolina has eleven, Nevada has twelve, Illinois has fifteen, and Pennsylvania the individual aggravators are very broad in their application as well. For example, a defendant is death-eligible if he or she "committed the offense while lying in wait, from ambush, or by use of an explosive. . . ." 92 The Colorado Supreme Court has noted the application of this aggravator where the defendant conceals his purpose, conceals his presence or surprises the victim, or the defendant waits for an opportune moment to strike. 93 For any murderer who kills "after deliberation," it will be the rare case in which the perpetrator did not also surprise the victim, or at least wait for an opportune moment to kill. Thus, the lying in wait aggravator has application in an extremely large number of murder cases in Colorado.
Similarly, any killing for which there is a "grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense" is death-eligible. 94 This aggravator would seem to apply to any killing that occurs where other potential victims are present. Other aggravating factors are considerably less broad: if the murder was committed in order to obtain items of pecuniary value, 95 the defendant was party to an agreement to kill, 96 more than one person was killed, 97 the victim was pregnant, 98 or the victim was a government officer, 99 then the defendant is deemed death-eligible.
The aggregate effect of the 17 Colorado aggravating factors is as straightforward as it is capacious. In order to be ineligible for the death penalty in Colorado, the murder must not be "cruel or heinous," it must not be committed by someone with serious prior or concurrent felonies, it must not be committed has seventeen aggravating circumstances. In California, if a capital jury finds one or more of twenty-one statutory special circumstances, the case proceeds to the penalty phase and the jury then is instructed to consider eleven other factors in deciding whether to impose death." Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier in order to get something of monetary value, the murder must not endanger the life of anyone else, must not be the product of a plan or a surprise, and the victim must not be too young, a government official, pregnant, and so forth. 100 Once a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder and at least one aggravating factor has been proven to the jury, the selection question-weighing aggravators against mitigatorsis all that stands between a defendant and a death sentence. 101 The actual selection process by which the jury determines which first-degree murderers with aggravating factors are to be put to death and which are to receive life without parole is designed to be indeterminate and non-mechanical. The ultimate question of life or death, unlike the question of eligibility based on a statutory aggravator, is a question that rests squarely in the discretion of the jury. 102 That is to say, the ultimate question of sentence selection also fails to narrow the class of death-eligible offenders.
II. STUDY DESIGN AND LITERATURE REVIEW
In this Part we describe our empirical study of Colorado's death penalty statute, situating it within the context of the extensive work that other researchers have done on the narrowing effect of state death penalty statutes. The research in this area has focused on two related topics: the failure of capital statutes to satisfy the constitutionally mandated narrowing function, and the corresponding risk of arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty.
A. Failure to Narrow
Numerous scholars have presented persuasive explanations for why broad capital murder statutes listing numerous aggravating factors do not fulfill the narrowing 100. As Professor Kirchmeier has observed, the result of overly inclusive and long lists of aggravating factors "is a broad range of factors that can make almost every first degree murder defendant eligible for the death penalty." Kirchmeier, supra note 91, at 430-31.
101. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a) (2012). 102. Neither the weighing nor the selection process impose a meaningful, objective way to narrow the class of death-eligible offenders. See People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 844 (Colo. 1991) ("We have held that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors differs fundamentally from the functions of a jury in finding facts and applying the law as instructed by the court.").
requirement established by the United States Supreme Court. 103 As one commentator recently emphasized, the failure to narrow may be the "most significant remaining flaw" in the capital system, 104 and reform commissions have consistently recommended reducing the list of aggravating circumstances. 105 Such commentators stress that the overinclusive statutes make the majority of first-degree murderers eligible for the death penalty, and leave too much room for arbitrariness to influence which select few are prosecuted as capital offenders and sentenced to death. 106 Some researchers, including Professor David Baldus, have undertaken empirical research to provide direct quantitative evidence of the extent to which statutes in various states fail to narrow the class of death-eligible offenders. 107 In order to situate our study within the existing literature, this Section provides an overview of these previous studies.
In one of his earliest and most famous reviews of death penalty practices, Baldus and his colleagues found that 86% of people convicted of murder in Georgia over a five-year period were death-eligible. 108 More recently, Baldus headed a research team that used a sophisticated stratified sampling system to draw a representative sample of 1,900 cases from a total of 27,453 convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter in California between 1978 and 2002. 109 The researchers calculated the rates of death eligibility for all three types of murder under the law applicable to the case on appeal and under the 2008 California law, 110 and found that the rates were 55% and 59%, under the two death penalty statutes. 111 Focusing just on the rates under the 2008 law, the study revealed that the rates of death eligibility were 95% for the first-degree murder convictions, 38% for the second-degree murder convictions, 46% for the voluntary manslaughter convictions, and 86% for the factual first-degree murder cases. 112 This last category consisted of 18,982 cases where the evidence could have supported a first-degree murder conviction. 113 Another study of California sentencing practices using a different approach found remarkably similar rates of death eligibility. 114 Professors Steven Shatz and Nina Rivkind analyzed first-degree murder convictions appealed from 1988 to 1992 and found that 84% of the killers were death-eligible. 115 They obtained similar results when they examined samples of appealed second-degree murder cases and unchallenged murder convictions. 116 Using the formula that we adopted for this study, Shatz and Rivkind divided the number of defendants who were actually sentenced to death by the number who were death-eligible and calculated a death sentence rate of 11.4%. 
B. Risk of Arbitrariness and Discrimination
A pivotal factor in the Furman Court's decision that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied was the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination. 128 When a small number of people actually get the death penalty out of a large number who are death-eligible, there is too much room for unacceptable criteria like race to influence who will receive the ultimate punishment. 129 Since the death penalty was reinstated, numerous studies have been done to determine whether there is discrimination in the administration of the death penalty. 130 on the information available, were only able to categorize eight different types of crime as death-eligible. Notably, they classified a case as death-eligible if the circumstances included any of "the following elements that are part of the recurrent language of capital-eligible homicides across the states: (a) killings during the commission of robbery, burglary, rape or sexual assault, arson, and kidnapping; (b) killings of children below age six; (c) multiple-victim killings; (d) 'gangland' killings involving organized crime or street gangs; (e) 'institution' killings where the offender was confined in a correctional or other governmental institution; (f) sniper killings . . . (g) killings in the course of drug business." Id. They also included a count of killings of police officers obtained from the dataset Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA), which also is compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice through the FBI. Id. at 1817. Thus their percentages do not truly reflect the total number of cases that would be deatheligible in a state with a relatively large number of aggravating circumstances. In his affidavit, Baldus used these numbers to substantiate the validity of the percentages found in New Jersey, Maryland, and Nebraska using his methodology. The estimates using Baldus's case screening method compared to the SHR method are, respectively, 21% versus 25.5% in New Jersey, 21% versus 21.9% in Maryland, and 25% versus 28.9% in Nebraska. Baldus Declar. supra note 2, at 18. The similarity in the estimates buttresses confidence in both approaches. They are similar for these three states because the statutes in those states are similar to the Model Penal Code; the estimates are not expected to be similar in California, or in Colorado, because these two states have additional broadly applicable aggravating factors. Fagan and colleagues found that the death eligibility rate in Colorado was 26.1% which was in the higher half of the scores for the 38 states that had the death penalty at the time; that number vastly underestimated the true percentage as it only counted the eight Model Penal Code aggravators rather than the 17 aggravators actually listed in the Colorado statute. See id. at 16-17, 25 .
128. See supra Part I.A and accompanying text (describing the Eighth Amendment limits on the procedures used to sentence one to death).
129. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (noting that "it is equally clear that sentences are 'unusual' in the sense that the death penalty is infrequently imposed for murder").
130. Professor Baldus and a number of colleagues provided a rigorous examination of the impact of race in the study 131 that was introduced in McCleskey v. Kemp. 132 Using sophisticated analyses controlling for the characteristics of the crime, this research showed that in Georgia, between 1973 and 1979, defendants who murdered whites were 4.3 times more likely to get sentenced to death than those who murdered black victims. 133 Black defendants who murdered white victims were the most likely to get the death penalty. 134 By 1990 there were 28 studies, 135 including one in Colorado, 136 that examined whether there was discrimination in the application of the death penalty. A United States General Accounting Office review of those studies found that, in 82% of the studies, "race of the victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to be more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks." 137 More recent studies continue to find this race-of-victim effect, and sometimes also an increased risk of a death sentence for the black defendant/white victim combination or for black defendants in general. 138 There is also ) (a review of race-of-victim data within states that found strong evidence of race-of-victim bias such that defendants had a significantly higher chance of both being sentenced to death and executed if the victim was white); David C. Baldus & research revealing gender discrimination, 139 and arbitrariness based on where the murder is committed. 140 Much of the evidence shows that the discrimination operates at the point where the prosecutors decide who to charge capitally among the defendants eligible for the death penalty. 141 A previous study of the administration of the death penalty in Colorado found evidence of discrimination in prosecutorial decisions about when to seek the death penalty. 142 Hindson, Potter, and Radelet identified the 21 cases in which defendants were sentenced to death between 1972 and 2005, and the 110 cases in which the death penalty was sought between 1980 and 1999. 143 The authors found that the prosecution was much more likely to seek the death penalty when the victim was white than when the victim was black or Hispanic, and especially when the victim was a white woman compared to other race and gender combinations. 144 Our study confirms and bolsters these conclusions by showing that the death penalty system in Colorado fails to meaningfully narrow the class of Post-1990 Research, 41 NW CRIM. L. BULL. 6 (2005) (finding that, among jurisdictions where we have data, there is a consistent pattern of race-of-victim discrimination); DONOHUE, supra note 107, at 6-8 (finding that among deatheligible defendants, minority defendants were more likely to be charged capitally and get a death sentence when the victim was white compared to when the victim was also a minority, and that when the victim was white, minority defendants were more likely than white defendants to get the death penalty); Hindson et al., supra note 4, at 579 (the probability that the death penalty was sought in Colorado between 1980 and 1999 was 4.2 times higher for people who killed whites compared to those who killed blacks); have not yet analyzed our data for evidence of arbitrariness and discrimination in the administration of Colorado's death penalty statute, we conclude that the infrequency with which the penalty is sought and imposed in Colorado raises independent concerns under the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the
Previous research has shown that race and/or geography rather than egregiousness of the offense accounts for different prosecution outcomes in all but the most extreme cases where death is clearly justified or clearly unjustified. 145 Specifically, previous scholarship has concluded that "racial disparities in sentencing remain significant for all but the most aggravated of cases, for which offenders are sentenced to death close to [90] percent of the time." 146 Indeed, recent empirical evidence demonstrates that "the risk of systemic discrimination can be eliminated or drastically curtailed by limiting death eligibility to the most aggravated cases, in which there are few if any race disparities." 147 As our data shows, Colorado's capital sentencing statute, by failing to genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, permits unconstitutional
145. See EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 107; Armed Forces, supra note 138, at 1303; DONOHUE, supra note 107.
146. Sharon, supra note 10, at 247 (explaining a death sentencing rate of less than 85 or 90% can be expected to result in racial disparities in the application of the death penalty). "In particular, the Baldus group's study of racial discrimination in Georgia, relied upon by the petitioner in McCleskey v. Kemp, reached this conclusion. The study found that, among cases with nearly universal death sentencing, there was only a 2% difference between death-sentence rates for black and white defendants with white victims . . . Among less aggravated cases, where death sentences were imposed only 41% of the time, this racial variation rose to 26%." Id. at 247-48 n.138.
147. Armed Forces, supra note 138, at 1303.
arbitrariness to seep into the death penalty determination.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND FINDINGS
We turn now to our study, describing the collection of cases studied, our analysis of those cases, and our findings.
A. The Universe of Cases and Eliminating Cases Based on Objective Criteria
We studied every murder case filed in Colorado from January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2010, as identified by the Colorado State Judicial Branch. We did not sample these cases, but rather investigated the entire universe of murder cases in the state's judicial records during this period. Defense counsel obtained a list of these cases (the "State Judicial List") in response to a request to the Colorado State Judiciary. 148 We began with a universe of 1,350 murder cases. 149 All of these cases are listed in the appendix. 150 From this base of cases, the first step was to determine how many cases were either procedurally or factually firstdegree murders. 151 Because only first-degree murderers are 149. To be more precise, the State Judicial List includes 1,344 cases. However, this set of cases excluded six cases that have been provided to us by counsel for Mr. Montour. Five of the cases that the State Judicial List excluded were cases from the Eighteenth Judicial District for which the prosecution filed a death notice. It appears that the record keeping method in the Eighteenth Judicial District is such that the State Judiciary's search of all murder cases did not yield the death-noticed cases from that district. The sixth excluded case was from Rio Grande County and was excluded by the State Judiciary's disclosure apparently because it resulted in a conviction for child abuse resulting in death, not murder. Mr. Montour's counsel has filed a document with the Court certifying that all known cases in which the death penalty was sought during the relevant period of time have been included in the study. It is also worth pointing out that the 1,350 total cases include 22 cases in which the prosecution pursued the death penalty at any phase of the proceedings-pretrial, guilt-phase, or sentencing.
150. See infra Appendix 1. 151. As explained more fully below, the study looked at two types of murders as potentially eligible for death. First, actual first-degree murders, referred to as "procedural first-degree murders," were included. Second, those cases in which there was not a first-degree murder conviction but there was a conviction for a class one or two felony, and for which the facts in the record would have supported eligible for death in Colorado, 152 this was an important threshold step.
Unlike some previous studies, we did not limit our study to actual first-degree murder convictions. Steven Shatz and Nina Rivkind, authors of one of the leading studies in this field, reported only roughly 400 appealed first-degree murder convictions when they calculated the death eligibility and death sentence rates in California for a 4-year period. 153 In limiting their dataset to actual first-degree convictions, Shatz and Rivkind noted that their dataset would likely exclude "a significant number of less egregious first degree murder cases," cases for which an aggravating factor would not apply. 154 Their result would thus overstate the death eligibility rate in California. Our study is not susceptible to this sort of skewing, however, because we counted as first-degree murders all cases in which a defendant was either convicted of first-degree murder or could have been convicted of first-degree murder. In this way, our study includes those cases that are less atrocious and less likely to have obvious aggravating factors, but which are nonetheless first-degree murders as a factual matter. Our approach, then, is more conservative than that of other leading studies in the field.
The only exception to our decision to include all factual as well as actual first-degree murders was what leading empirical scholars have termed the controlling fact-finder (CFF) rule. 155 Under the CFF rule, deference is given to the factual conclusions of a jury or judge where a "judge or jury has made an authoritative finding of fact on a factual issue (concerning criminal liability. . .)." 156 Any case in which a defendant was in fact convicted of first-degree murder is treated as a first-degree murder. Thus, even where it seemed to us that the facts could not support more than a second-degree murder conviction, we coded as first-degree murder any case in which a defendant was actually convicted of that crime. 157 Likewise, we treated such a finding as a matter of law under a sufficiency of the evidence standard, were also included. any case in which a jury explicitly or implicitly acquitted a defendant of first-degree murder as a non-first-degree murder-even if we would have coded it differently. 158 In order to acquire data regarding each of the 1,350 cases identified by the State Judiciary, several paralegals, law students, and lawyers were employed by defense counsel to serve as a Data Collection Team ("DCT"). The DCT's work assisted the study authors-the Expert Review Team ("ERT")-in many ways. The first was to eliminate non-firstdegree murder cases from the dataset using the CFF standard. Even if a case had clear aggravating factors, if there was an acquittal of first-degree murder, the case was not reviewed by the ERT for the presence of aggravating factors.
The DCT was also instructed to remove cases from the study based on three criteria: (1) the absence of a deceased victim-that is, cases of attempted murder, aggravated assault, etc.; 159 (2) the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense and thus ineligible for execution; 160 or (3) the defendant was ultimately convicted of a crime less serious than a seconddegree felony. 161 This last category includes convictions for second-degree murder in the heat of passion, conspiracy to commit second-degree murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, and other crimes of violence that are a class three felony or less. 162 which a first-degree murder conviction was later set aside for insufficiency of the evidence. That is, we deferred to juries unless a court concluded that no reasonable jury could have come to the same conclusion.
158. In addition, if the jury acquitted the defendant of a lesser crime, then this was treated as a CFF for purposes of precluding a finding of first-degree murder. For example, if a jury found the defendant not guilty of second-degree murder, this is treated as a CFF and the case could not be death-eligible.
159. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty for a defendant convicted of aggravated rape).
160. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the death penalty for defendants under the age of 18 at the time of their crime).
161. For purposes of this study, even when there was not a CFF, we excluded cases where the ultimate conviction was less than a class two felony. Our decision was based on the theory that prosecutors would not be inclined to prosecute a first-degree murder case as merely a class three felony or less. There were only 79 total cases excluded on this basis.
162. Conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is a class two felony in Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-206(1) (2012). Accordingly, if the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and there was a deceased victim, the case remained in the study. Only cases in which it was a class three felony or lower, or where there was no deceased victim, were excluded.
The DCT was also asked to note any case in which the prosecution actually sought the death penalty against the defendant. There were five cases in which the prosecution had initially pursued the death penalty but in which the defendant was acquitted, either directly or impliedly, of first-degree murder. These cases were excluded from the study under the CFF rule. 163 There were an additional 17 cases in which the prosecution sought the death penalty and obtained a conviction for either first-degree murder following a plea bargain or a trial (13 cases) or for a class two felony following a plea bargain (4 cases). Because our research objective was to identify those cases in which the prosecutor could have sought death, and because we agreed with the prosecution's conclusion that these cases could have resulted in a death sentence-that they were factual first-degree murders and aggravators were present-all 17 of these cases were coded as first-degree murder with aggravating factors. 164 Applying all of these objective criteria, 661 cases were excluded from the study, leaving 689 cases for which a DCT exclusion did not apply. 165 In addition, during the litigation of Accordingly, a defendant convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, which is a class two felony, could be guilty of first-degree murder as an accomplice under Colorado law. . These cases were eliminated under the CFF Rule described supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text. Accordingly, there were a total of 17 death-noticed cases included in the study.
164. Baldus et al., Methdological Issues, supra note 1, at 166 (explaining that in studying prosecutorial decision making it is appropriate to give weight to the fact that the "prosecution viewed such a case as death eligible").
165. There was a total 661 cases excluded by the DCT. Accordingly, that left 689 cases for ERT review (1,350 -661 = 689). The 661 exclusions are comprised of 408 cases in which there was no deceased victim (for example, attempts, solicitations or conspiracies that did not result in murder, etc.), 79 cases committed by a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, 78 cases in which the conviction was for a class three felony or less, 90 cases excluded by the CFF Rule (including 5 in which the prosecution had filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty), and one "test" case number that was not an actual case. We excluded 5 additional cases on unique grounds: (1) one defendant extradited to Colorado on the basis of an agreement to not seek the death penalty; (2) 3 cold cases that occurred prior to Colorado's enactment of a new death penalty the Montour case the prosecution, in an effort to challenge this study, identified 8 cases that the State Judicial List had omitted and that should have been sent to the ERT. 166 Applying the objective criteria described above, the DCT was able to determine that 7 of these cases in fact ought to have been included on the state's original list. 167 These 7 cases were added to the 689 received from the State Judiciary, yielding a total of 696 for expert review.
For each of these 696 remaining cases, the DCT was tasked with compiling as much information as possible in order to reveal the salient facts about each of the murders so that we could review the case in the manner described immediately below. The DCT gathered court dockets, charging information, appellate court decisions, police reports and affidavits contained in the district court file, and media accounts. Based on the DCT's research, a "case file" was generated that included all of the information that the DCT gathered regarding each of the 696 murders during the relevant time period. These case files were the basis of our review.
B. Expert Review
The expert review of the case files focused on three basic questions: (1) whether there was sufficient information in the file to make the relevant determinations; and if so, (2) whether the case was either factually or procedurally a first-degree murder; and if so, (3) whether one or more of the statutorily enumerated aggravating factors was present.
If the ERT concluded that there was insufficient information in the case file, the case was sent back to the DCT for additional research. If, after additional research, there was still insufficient information, the case was excluded from the 166. The prosecution actually identified 96 "additional cases" in a filing with the Eighteenth Judicial District that were not included on the State Judicial List. However, the State later conceded only 8 of the cases would have been included in our study, had they been reported by the State Judicial Branch. Accordingly, we focus on the 8 new cases, concluding that 7 of them meet the study's criteria for inclusion.
167. One of the 8 cases was a conviction for child abuse resulting in death. COLO. REV. STAT. § § 18-6-401(1)(a), 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) (2012). This statute was beyond the scope of the request to the State Judicial Branch, which was asked to provide convictions related to COLO. REV. STAT. § § 18-3-102 and 18-3-103.
study. There were 33 cases for which there was insufficient information about either first-degree murder liability, or aggravating factors, or both. In each such case the DCT was unable to obtain additional information, and the ERT conclusively determined that there was insufficient information to reach a conclusion. Because there was insufficient information to review 33 of the 696 murder cases that were part of the study, 663 total cases remained for ERT analysis.
Factual or Procedural First-Degree Murder
The ERT assessed each of the 663 cases that were ultimately included in the study. The threshold question in determining the rate of death eligibility for this class of defendants was an expert determination of whether the case was a first-degree murder. In assessing whether a case was a first-degree murder for purposes of the study, we considered whether: (1) the case was coded as first-degree murder with aggravating factors based on the prosecution's filing of a notice of intent to seek the death penalty (death-noticed); (2) the defendant was actually convicted of first-degree murder (procedural first-degree murder); or (3) the facts in the case file provided by the DCT were legally sufficient to support a firstdegree murder charge (factual first-degree murder). 168 The standard we used in evaluating whether a case was a factual first-degree murder was a legal sufficiency standard. 169 Under this standard, the question is not what the expert believes is the correct factual determination in a given case, nor how a reasonable jury should resolve the issue. 170 Rather, the question is whether a Colorado appellate court would 168. The exact language of the standard agreed upon by the ERT is: "Whether, based on all of the information contained in the file-the arrest warrant affidavit, the statement of the defendant, the facts as stated in an appellate opinion, etc.-there exists sufficient evidence to support on appeal a jury verdict of first-degree murder and/or an aggravating factor?" That is, our ultimate inquiry was: "Could a jury hearing this evidence-read in the light most favorable to the prosecutionreasonably conclude that first-degree murder and/or an aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt?"
169. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (holding that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction whenever, after viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (Colo. 1973) ("The same test for measuring the sufficiency of evidence [applies] whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.").
170. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Bennett, 512 P.2d at 469.
affirm a first-degree murder conviction in the case if one were returned by a jury. 171 That is, we reviewed the facts in the case file, giving particular weight to available appellate court opinions, and determined whether a jury verdict convicting the defendant of first-degree murder would be supported by the facts when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 172 Using the approach set forth above, the ERT coded each of the 663 cases as either first-degree murder or not first-degree murder. First, we identified those cases for which there was a procedural first-degree murder-that is, an actual first-degree murder conviction. For those cases in which there was not a first-degree murder conviction, and for which the jury did not explicitly reject first-degree murder, we made the determination whether the facts satisfied the legal sufficiency standard-that is, whether the cases were factually firstdegree murder. The DCT compiled our conclusions. Of the 663 cases studied, 604 cases were either factually or procedurally first-degree murder, and only 59 of the cases were not. 173 Thus, including the 17 cases that were actually prosecuted as death-noticed first-degree murders-which we agree were first-degree murders-the first-degree murder rate is 91.1%. 174 The overwhelmingly high percentage of murders that the ERT found to be first-degree murder under Colorado law is not surprising given the breadth of Colorado's first-degree murder statute. However, such data leaves no doubt that the constitutionally required narrowing is not occurring at the stage of first-degree murder liability. 175
Aggravating Factor Liability
Of the 604 cases that we coded as either factually or procedurally first-degree murder, we determined that an additional 8 cases had to be excluded from our aggravating factor analysis because the defendants were not in fact death-171. Scholars conducting similar studies in other cases have applied a similar approach. See, e.g., Methodological Issues, supra note 1, at 165 (describing the inquiry as assessing whether the "facts of the cases could have supported a capital murder conviction").
172. See supra note 168. 173. The total of 604 cases consists of 587 cases in which the prosecution sought the death penalty, and 17 in which it did not.
174. The percentage is arrived at by dividing 604 / 663 = 91.1%. 175. See infra note 187.
eligible. First, from the 587 first-degree murder cases in which the death penalty was not sought, we excluded 6 cases on the basis of Eighth Amendment proportionality principles. 176 Specifically, we concluded that 6 of the non-death-noticed firstdegree murder cases had to be excluded based on the defendant's insufficient participation in the killing. As with cases excluded by the DCT because the defendant was a juvenile, these cases were excluded from the study on the basis of the defendant's inherent ineligibility for the death penalty. 177 These cases, then, are ineligible for death, not because of any legislative narrowing-which is the focus of this study-but because of a specific constitutional rule. 178 Thus, although they were used to calculate the percentage of Colorado murders that could have been first-degree murderbecause they were relevant to that question-they are not death-eligible cases and were removed from the analysis at this point. Second, of the 17 cases in which the prosecution initially sought the death penalty, 2 cases were found by Colorado courts to be legally ineligible for the death penalty. 179 Accordingly, we excluded a total of 8 additional cases from the aggravating factor analysis because although these cases may have had (and in many cases did have) aggravating factors, they were legally ineligible for a sentence of death. These exclusions were necessary because our study was designed to assess the effectiveness of Colorado's legislative scheme in narrowing the class of death-eligible offenders, and 177. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 158 (holding that the death penalty is permissible for a non-killer only where he or she had more than minor participation in the felonious conduct and was at least reckless with regard to death).
178. Id. )). Accordingly, the total number of death prosecutions is best thought of as 15-that is, there were 15 cases where the prosecution noticed death and was not legally barred from pursuing a death sentence at trial. these 8 cases are ineligible for death because of rules external to applicable legislative rules.
In sum, of the entire universe of cases for which there was sufficient information, we determined that there were 596 (604 -8 = 596) first-degree murder cases that were potentially death eligible, but in which the death penalty was not actually sought. For each of the 596 factual or procedural first-degree murder cases, we assessed whether one or more statutory aggravating factors was present. That is to say, for every case defined as a factual or procedural first-degree murder that was not death ineligible under either the state or federal Constitution, we evaluated whether at least one statutory aggravating factor was present under the legal sufficiency standard set forth above. 180 As with the first-degree murder analysis, we did not code the cases based on what we believed was the correct factual determination or based on how we believed a jury should have resolved the issue. Instead, the question was whether the facts were legally sufficient to support a jury finding of one or more aggravating factors-that is, would a Colorado appellate court affirm a finding of an aggravating factor if the factor were found by a jury. 181 Moreover, because of time constraints, the large number of cases, and Colorado's extensive list of aggravating factors, 182 we did not assess every possible aggravating factor for each case file; rather, our research question was simply whether one or more aggravating factors were supported by the evidence in the case file. 183 Once we were certain that at least one aggravating factor was present in a particular case, we simply moved on to the next one.
Based on our review of the 596 qualifying first-degree murder cases, we found one or more aggravating factors in 539 180. Again, a sufficiency of the evidence standard, based on Jackson, was used to determine whether, based on the facts in the case file, a reasonable jury could have found an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979 428-29 (1980) (suggesting that the breadth of an aggravator may be assessed by considering whether a "person of ordinary sensibility" would find the aggravator applicable to a particular factual situation); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988) (considering the breadth of an aggravator by assessing the circumstances in which an "ordinary person could honestly believe" that the aggravator applied).
of the cases. 184 In other words, we found that only 57 of the relevant procedural and factual first-degree murder cases did not satisfy a legal sufficiency standard as to one or more aggravating factors. This means that for the entire 12-year period, 90.4% of the factual or procedural first-degree murders that we examined in Colorado were death-eligible based on the existence of at least one aggravating factor. 185 These figures demonstrate that, because of the breadth and quantity of aggravating factors specified in the Colorado statute, the system fails to meaningfully narrow the class of death-eligible offenders. 186 Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, this is the highest death eligibility rate of any jurisdiction that has been studied. 187
C. Findings Summarized
Figure 1 summarizes our findings in a stylized format based on the Georgia Supreme Court's metaphor of a pyramid pierced by planes. 188 Our pyramid moves from all of the cases identified on the State Judicial List at the bottom, through those cases in which a death sentence was actually obtained at the top. 187. As explained above, the aggravating factor, or death eligibility, rate in our study is approximately 90%. For comparison purposes, in concluding that California's death eligibility rate is uniquely inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment, Shatz and Rivkind found that approximately 87% of first-degree murder cases were death-eligible. Requiem for Furman, supra note 2, at 1330; see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 9, at 375 ("The most detailed study of deatheligibility within a state-conducted by the famous Baldus group-found that approximately eighty-six percent of all persons convicted of murder in Georgia over a five year period after the adoption of Georgia's new statute were deatheligible under that scheme.").
188. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 871-72 (1983); see also supra, Part I.A.
Figure 1: Case Comparisons Pyramid
It is important to remember that Figure 1 is not to scale. Rather, it merely shows the relevant categories of our analysis. Figure 2 gives a sense of scale and demonstrates our fundamental conclusion that the Colorado death penalty statute makes many eligible for death but that very, very few cases result in a capital sentence.
Figure 2: Case Comparisons Bar Graph
Based on these results we calculated 4 statistics that are relevant to the constitutionality of the Colorado's death penalty system. First, we calculated Colorado's first-degree murder rate. Including death-noticed prosecutions, there were a total of 663 cases considered. Of the 663 murder cases analyzed, 604 of them were either factual or procedural first-degree murders. Thus, we found that the percentage of murders during the study period that either were or could have been prosecuted as first-degree murder was 91.1%. 189 That is, fewer than 9% of those convicted of murder from 1999 through 2010 were ineligible for a first-degree murder conviction. 190 189. 604 / 663 = 91.1%. 190. Based in part on this finding, our study takes for granted that Colorado's aggravating factors are designed to perform the requisite narrowing required by the Eighth Amendment. No other feature of Colorado's capital sentencing scheme materially, predictably, and non-arbitrarily imposes legislative limits on the death eligibility of a defendant guilty of first-degree murder. See People v.
Second, we calculated Colorado's aggravating factor rate. The aggravating factor rate is the percentage of factual or procedural first-degree murder cases in which there was at least one aggravating factor present. This rate was calculated using the 539 cases in which we found one or more aggravating factors, including the death-noticed cases for which the prosecution actually sought (and was legally permitted to seek) the death penalty, 191 and the 596 death-eligible first-degree cases, including death-noticed prosecutions. Specifically, we concluded that Colorado's aggravating factor rate during the study period was 539 of 596, or 90.4%. That is, in 90.4% of the death-eligible factual or procedural first-degree murder cases during the 12-year period studied, at least one aggravating factor was present. If one takes seriously the constitutional obligation that "states narrow death-eligibility through the use of aggravating circumstances," then this figure, standing alone, demonstrates unequivocally that Colorado's system is unconstitutional. 192 A scheme of "such broad death-eligibility essentially guarantees that some defendants caught in the net will not be among the truly 'worst' offenders." 193 Third, we calculated Colorado's death prosecution rate. We evaluated the prosecution rate both pretrial (initial decision to formally seek death) and at trial. To calculate the pretrial Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 735 (Colo. 1999) (recognizing that in both weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions the "constitutionally mandated first step" for death eligibility is the conviction of the defendant of murder and the finding of "one aggravating circumstance (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase") (" [T] he finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, or 'aggravating factor' under our statutory terminology, is an essential constitutional component of [the] death penalty."); see also People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448, 483 (Colo. 2000) (" [A] death sentence imposed on the basis of a statutory aggravating factor that fails to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty . . . violates the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.").
191. As previously noted, supra note 149, the prosecution actually sought death in 22 cases during the relevant period of time. However, 5 of these death prosecutions resulted in acquittals on the first-degree murder charge and are, thus, not part of the study based on the CFF rule. Moreover, 2 of the deathnoticed prosecutions were legally barred. 192. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 9, at 373. 193. Id. at 415 ("The wrongful inclusion of such undeserving offenders is problematic in terms of both proportionality (excessive punishment) and equality (random inclusion of undeserving defendants when similarly situated offenders, and even more deserving offenders, do not get the death penalty).").
death prosecution rate, we divided the number of cases in which the prosecution formally sought the death penalty by the number of cases in which the death penalty could have been sought. Excluding the 5 death prosecution cases that resulted in acquittals, and excluding the 2 death prosecutions that were legally barred for other reasons, 194 the State sought death, pretrial, in 15 cases; under the statute, it could have sought death in 539 cases. 195 Consequently, the pretrial death prosecution rate was 15 of 539, or 2.78%.
To calculate the trial death prosecution rate, we looked at only those cases in which the prosecution continued to pursue a sentence of death at the conclusion of the guilt-phase of the case and compared the number of those cases to the number of cases in which an aggravating factor was present. Of the 15 death sentences pursued by the prosecution pretrial that were not legally barred, there were only 5 cases in which the death penalty was still being sought at the time of the sentencing phase trial. 196 Accordingly, the trial death prosecution rate was 5 of 539, or 0.93%.
Fourth, we evaluated Colorado's death sentence rate. To calculate the death sentence rate we compared the actual number of death sentences during this period to the number of factual or procedural first-degree murders in which there was . The other death prosecutions included the 5 acquittals on the first-degree murder charge, supra note 163, the 2 death prosecutions that were legally barred, see supra note 191, one in which the jury could not reach a verdict and the death notice was withdrawn prior to the second trial (People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 691 (Colo. 2010)), and 9 cases in which the death penalty was dropped pursuant to a plea bargain.
To determine that only 5 cases were still death prosecutions at the time of the sentencing trial we eliminated the following cases from the 22 cases in which the prosecution originally sought death: (a) 5 acquittals on the first-degree murder charge, see supra note 163; (b) 2 cases in which the death penalty was legally barred, see supra note 191; (c) 2 cases in which the prosecution dropped the death penalty prosecution; and (d) 8 cases that resulted in a guilty plea to first-degree murder or to a lesser offense and in which no capital sentencing proceeding was held and no death sentence was imposed.
at least one aggravating factor present. That is to say, we compared the number of cases in which the prosecution could have sought death or did seek death, based on the presence of one or more aggravating factors, with the number of cases in which the prosecution in fact obtained a death sentence. Specifically, although there were 539 cases in which at least one aggravating factor was present and in which the prosecution could have sought the death penalty, a sentence of death was returned in only 3 cases. 197 Accordingly, Colorado has a death sentence rate of 3 of 539, or 0.56%. Scholarship in the field indicates that a substantially higher death sentence rate is necessary for a capital sentencing system to comply with the Eighth Amendment. 198 Even this figure overstates the death sentence rate for two reasons. First, none of the 3 death sentences handed down during the relevant time period is yet final. 199 Most notably, in order to be conservative, we have counted the 2003 death sentence for Edward Montour, Jr. as one of the 3 successful death prosecutions during the study period even though it was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court and Montour is currently awaiting resentencing. 200 Second, the only other 2 death sentences, which arose out of the same double homicide, are not yet final on appeal as the state court review process has not yet concluded. 201 Thus, these sentences might be overturned as well.
CONCLUSION
The data compiled in this study-the first complete study of Colorado's effectiveness in narrowing the class of death-eligible offenders-compels the conclusion that Colorado's death penalty system is unconstitutional.
First, and perhaps most notably, in over 90% of the cases in which a person is found (or could be found) guilty of firstdegree murder in Colorado, one or more of the aggravating factors applies, thus making the defendant eligible for the ultimate punishment. Given Colorado's capacious definition of first-degree murder-a definition that permits over 91% of all murder defendants to be charged with first-degree murderthere is little question that Colorado's system fails to comply with the narrowing obligations imposed by Gregg. 202 Leading death penalty scholars Jordan Steiker and Carol Steiker have concluded that in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment, "the class of the death-eligible should not be tremendously greater than, say, five or ten[%] of all murderers." 203 In Colorado, this figure is flipped-under 10% of murders are not death-eligible.
In addition, the death sentencing rate in Colorado is indicative of a sentencing scheme that has failed to produce legislative standards capable of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible offenders. 204 As Justice Brennan once observed, "when the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily." 205 Building on this conclusion, scholars have recognized that the holding in Furman that the death penalty statutes were unconstitutional is grounded in large part on the fact that "relatively few (fifteen to twenty[%]) of the number of death eligible murderers were being sentenced to death." 206
